Essays on Dynamic Ticket Pricing: Evidence from Major League Baseball Tickets by Zhu, Jian-Da
ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC TICKET PRICING: EVIDENCE FROM MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL TICKETS
A Dissertation
by
JIAN-DA ZHU
Submitted to the Oﬃce of Graduate and Professional Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chair of Committee, Steven L. Puller
Co-Chair of Committee, Stephanie Houghton
Committee Members, Steven Wiggins
Ramkumar Janakiraman
Head of Department, Timothy Gronberg
August 2014
Major Subject: Economics
Copyright 2014 Jian-Da Zhu
ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes two essays. In the ﬁrst essay, I use Major League Base-
ball ticket data, both in the primary market and in the secondary market, from one
anonymous franchise in the 2011 season to study how the franchise can price dynam-
ically to increase its revenue. Compared using a uniform price schedule over time,
my model proposes that the franchise can see increased revenue by decreasing ticket
prices as the game day approaches. In the counterfactual experiment, the revenue
for the franchise can increase by approximately 6.93% as long as the assumption
holds that consumers are not strategic in either market. However, if consumers are
strategic in purchasing tickets, the revenue for the franchise will increase by around
3.67%.
In the second essay, I focus further on the secondary market using both listing and
transaction data from StubHub to study diﬀerent pricing strategies for the diﬀerent
types of sellers. The data show that the sellers on StubHub can be separated into
two types: single sellers and brokers. The single sellers sell tickets in just one or two
games during the whole season. The brokers sell many tickets in a given game and
also sell tickets in most of the games during the season. I use the data to estimate
the probability of sale by the probit model ﬁrst and then calculate the optimal prices
for each listing on each day. The benchmark model shows that brokers price more
optimally (meaning smaller expected proﬁt losses) on the ﬁnal day of sales. However,
the two types of sellers have similar expected proﬁt losses on other days.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports are widely popular in the United States, and because of the
convenience of the internet, tickets can now be sold online at any time not only
from the oﬃcial team website, but also from other online marketplaces. This also
provides the ﬂexibility of allowing sellers to adjust prices. For instance, in the primary
market, the franchise can dynamically price tickets for diﬀerent games on diﬀerent
days. In the secondary market, like StubHub, the resellers can adjust their listing
prices frequently on days leading up to the game. Therefore, the issue of dynamic
pricing has become increasingly popular and important in the sports ticket market.
In my dissertation, I discuss dynamic pricing issues not only in the primary market
for the franchise but also in the secondary market for the diﬀerent types of resellers.
In the ﬁrst chapter, I investigate how the franchise can optimally price tickets
keeping in mind that resale is quite prevalent in the secondary market. Unlike the
hotel and airline industries, to which the sports ticket industry is often compared,
the secondary market should be taken into consideration as we discuss the dynamic
pricing issue for the franchise in the primary market. In addition, I have considered
two types of consumers in the market. Both non-strategic and strategic consumers
are introduced to estimate the eﬀect of dynamic pricing.
In the second chapter, I will present how sellers on StubHub use dynamic pricing
strategies to optimize their proﬁts on the days leading up to the game. These can be
divided into two types of sellers, single sellers and brokers. They are introduced in
the market to study how much expected proﬁt loss they have on the diﬀerent days
before the game.
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2. EFFECT OF RESALE ON OPTIMAL TICKET PRICING
2.1 Introduction
The franchise can price its tickets diﬀerently in three kinds of ways. First, the
franchise can set diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent seats based on the quality of the seats,
so seats with better views are priced higher in the stadium than those with less
optimal views. Second, because the demand for each game might not be the same
during one season, the franchise can price one particular seat diﬀerently for each
game. For instance, prices should be higher for some particularly interesting games,
and because the demand is higher during the weekend, prices are relatively higher
than those on weekdays. Third, besides pricing over diﬀerent seats and diﬀerent
games, the franchise can also adjust prices during the days before the event. There
are two reasons for the franchise to do that. One is that consumers buying tickets
on diﬀerent days might have diﬀerent willingness to pay, so the franchise can provide
diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent types of consumers. The other reason is that the demand
may ﬂuctuate during the days before the event, so adjusting prices in response to
changing demand elasticity may increase the revenue. For example, for those more
popular games, the franchise might increase prices over time if the demand increases
as the event approaches.
For these three methods, the ﬁrst two have been widely used for all the franchises,
and the third one was ﬁrst introduced by San Francisco Giants in 2009. Nowadays,
more than half of the Major League Baseball franchises have implemented dynamic
pricing for their tickets. Because of the existence of the secondary market and the
behavior of consumers, it is plausible to understand the beneﬁt of dynamic pricing
in the days before the event. In the sports ticket market, the secondary market plays
2
an important role in competition; sellers in the secondary market might change their
listed prices to respond to the price changes in the primary market. In addition, the
behavior of consumers can determine the eﬀect of dynamic pricing. For instance, the
dynamic pricing might not have the eﬀect on the revenue if consumers can predict
the future price and strategically choose when to purchase tickets. In this chapter,
I consider the behavior of consumers and the competition between the primary and
the secondary market to study whether the franchise can dynamically change prices
during the days before the event to increase the revenue.
Figure 2.1: Average Prices in Both Markets Over Time
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I use Major League Baseball tickets as the example. The data consist of transac-
tion information in the primary market and the secondary market (StubHub) for all
the home events of one anonymous Major League Baseball team in the 2011 season.
Figure 2.1 shows the price trends in the two markets. StubHub is the most popular
3
secondary market for sports tickets in the United States. Sellers can list their tick-
ets on StubHub anonymously and can easily change listed prices at any time. On
StubHub, prices decline over time because sellers have decreasing opportunity cost
of holding tickets (Sweeting, 2012). However, in the primary market tickets are sold
by the ﬁxed price menu announced in the early season. The ﬂuctuation of prices in
the primary market only depends on the quality of seats sold.
Although there is a price diﬀerence between the two markets in Figure 2.1, there is
almost no diﬀerence in the transaction costs of purchasing across the two markets. On
the buying pages of the Major League Baseball oﬃcial website, the link to StubHub
can also be found. Consumers can easily go to the StubHub website to search
for tickets if they can not ﬁnd tickets they want available in the primary market.
Therefore, I append the two markets together and jointly estimate the demand for
both markets. In order to capture the diﬀerence between the two markets and to
rationalize the price diﬀerence for consumers, I include the dummy variable for the
secondary market which can be explained as consumers’ loyalty to StubHub.
In the demand estimation, two kinds of models are introduced to describe two dif-
ferent kinds of consumers, non-strategic and strategic consumers. Although Sweeting
(2012) ﬁnds that consumers are not strategic in the secondary market, such as eBay
and StubHub, the pricing strategy by franchises can be treated as public informa-
tion for consumers. Therefore, strategic consumers should also be considered because
consumers might choose the optimal time to buy tickets by this public information.
In order to estimate the revenue change after dynamic pricing by the franchise, I
separately estimate two extreme models: one is the static demand model with all
the non-strategic consumers, and the other one is the dynamic demand model with
all the strategic consumers. Then, in the real world with two types of consumers
mixed together, the revenue change might be within the range of the two extreme
4
cases.
In the static demand model, homogeneous consumers enter into the market ran-
domly to purchase tickets, and they leave the market if they decide not to buy any
tickets. I use the random utility discrete choice model to estimate the static demand
for the two markets. In the dynamic demand model, consumers are homogeneous
and strategic in choosing the time of purchasing tickets. In the beginning, all the
consumers come into the market and start to buy tickets in both markets. If they
do not buy tickets in the current period, they can stay in the market and wait to
buy tickets in the next period. Consumers compare tickets available in the current
period with those expected to appear in the future, and they decide not to buy tick-
ets today if they expect to gain higher utility in the future. The model follows the
dynamic BLP-style model in Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) and Conlon (2012),
and I exclude the upgrade choice for consumers in the model. However, in order to
mitigate the burden of computation, I assume that consumers are homogeneous and
have the same perception of the future, so there is no random coeﬃcient term for
prices or other characteristics in the model.
After estimating two kinds of demand systems, I model the behavior of sellers
in the secondary market. The intertemporal problem for sellers in the secondary
market is to decide the optimal price of tickets based on the current demand and
the expected future value. First, I use the true data and estimated price elasticities
to recover the expected value of tickets for sellers in each period. Then, in the
counterfactual experiment, we can assume the same expected value of tickets for each
seller in each period and solve the optimal price in the secondary market when the
franchise changes the price in the primary market. Consequently, the counterfactual
experiment shows that the franchise can use a declining price schedule instead of
uniform price to increase revenue. In the static demand model, revenue can be
5
increased by around 6.93% compared with that in the uniform price. However, the
revenue change for the franchise becomes smaller if consumers are assumed strategic
in the dynamic model, and the revenue can only be increased by around 3.67%.
This chapter focuses on an important component of a franchise’s pricing problem
— dynamically pricing single game ticket prices as gameday approaches. A complete
analysis of optimal pricing, including the pricing of season tickets, is beyond the
scope of this paper. Season ticket pricing can interact with single game pricing in
some important ways. For instance, the number of consumers buying season tickets
might be aﬀected if the franchise changes the original ﬁxed price menu into the
dynamic one. This paper does not consider the eﬀect of season tickets. The direct
eﬀect should be the revenue loss from the season ticket. Some resellers might not
want to buy season tickets because the expected proﬁts for reselling become lower.
In addition, the indirect eﬀect is the distortion of the supply side in the secondary
market. Less sellers sell their tickets in the secondary market, so prices might go up
because of less competition.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
related literature. Section 2.3 summarizes the data in both markets. Section 2.4
presents the model including the demand side and the supply side. Section 2.5
shows the estimation method and results. Section 2.6 provides the counterfactual
experiment based on the result of demand estimation. Section 2.7 concludes the
research.
2.2 Literature Review
In this section, two groups of literature related to ticket pricing are introduced.
First, I mention some literature using price discrimination to describe how the fran-
chise prices tickets in the stadium. Then, some theoretical and empirical literature
6
is presented to discuss the eﬀects of resale in the market.
For ticket pricing in one stadium, Courty (2000) is a good review to discuss sev-
eral categories of ticket pricing issues in the entertainment market, including the art,
music, and sports events. Besides the pricing strategy based on the quality of seats,
the most prevalent issue in ticket pricing literature is price discrimination. Theoret-
ical literature discusses price discrimination within diﬀerent frameworks. Rosen and
Rosenﬁeld (1997) use second-degree price discrimination to discuss how the monopoly
franchise prices tickets under the deterministic demand. Dana, Jr (1999) shows that
the franchise can price diﬀerently for the homogeneous seats under the uncertain
demand to increase the proﬁts. In the empirical research, Leslie (2004) uses data
from Broadway theater to show that observed price discrimination can increase the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt relative to uniform pricing policies. In addition, Courty and Pagliero
(2012) ﬁnd the same eﬀect of price discrimination in the concert tour data.
As the resale becomes prevalent in the market, more literature has discussed the
eﬀect of resale on the proﬁts of franchises and the welfare of consumers. Theoretical
literature always uses the two-period model to illustrate the role of brokers (see
Courty (2003a), Courty (2003b), Geng, Wu, and Whinston (2007), and DeSerpa
(1994)). Most literature mentions that resale has a negative eﬀect on franchise
proﬁts, and the franchise can not capture the proﬁts earned by brokers. However,
Karp and Perloﬀ (2005) propose a diﬀerent model to sketch the beneﬁts of resale, they
ﬁnd that the franchise may beneﬁt from brokers if the franchise can not distinguish
types of consumers.
Furthermore, some empirical literature uses anti-ticket scalping laws to identify
the eﬀects of resale. Williams (1994) uses NFL data to ﬁnd that prices are lower
under the anti-ticket scalping law, and the franchise charges higher ticket prices if
resale is prevalent in the market. Elfenbein (2006) ﬁnds that ticket resale regulations
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do aﬀect online trading. Because regulations reduce the number of transactions
online, prices in the secondary market become higher. Depken (2006) indicates that
franchises can increase revenue by the anti-scalping laws as the attendance is not
aﬀected by the law. Besides using the anti-scalping laws to identify the eﬀect of
resale, Leslie and Sorensen (2014) use the structural model to show that resale does
increase allocative eﬃciency. The data they use are market sales in the primary
and secondary market for a sample of rock concerts, and the two-stage model allows
consumers to buy in the ﬁrst stage and to resell in the second stage. As a result, the
welfare of consumers attending the event may decrease because of resale, and the
surplus generated by eﬃcient reallocation is gained mostly by resellers.
To analyze sports tickets in the secondary market, Sweeting (2012) uses Major
League Baseball ticket data from two online secondary markets: eBay and StubHub.
He ﬁnds that prices are decreasing over time as the game date approaches, and the
sellers lower the price because of the decreasing opportunity cost of holding tickets.
Furthermore, he uses data to test how accurately traditional dynamic pricing models
describe sellers’ behavior, and he shows that simplest dynamic pricing models can ﬁt
the behavior of sellers very well, and consumers are not strategic in buying tickets
in the secondary market.
Unlike the previous literature which nests the primary market and secondary
market together as two separate periods, I put these two markets together in each
period. The advantage of putting two markets together is that we can understand
how consumers choose between two markets, and the competition between markets
can be captured by the model. However, the drawback is that consumers buying
tickets in the primary market are not allowed to resell their tickets in the secondary
market. Although it sounds unreasonable in the real world, the data shows that
most resellers buy their tickets from the primary market by season ticket price and
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list their tickets much earlier on StubHub. If we focus on two weeks before the event,
not too many consumers actually buy tickets in the primary market and resell those
tickets on StubHub. Instead of using the previous literature model to analyze the
sports ticket market, I focus more on the competition between the two markets, and
the response of resellers is also included into the model.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Transaction Data
The data contain all the transaction information in both the primary market
and the secondary market for all the home events of one anonymous Major League
Baseball franchise in 2011.1 The primary market includes all the channels through
the franchise, such as phone, internet, and box oﬃce. The secondary market data
are only from StubHub, the largest ticket marketplace in the United States.
Table 2.1: Number of Tickets Sold Over Time in the Two Markets
Primary Market StubHub
Days Prior Single Game Package
to Game Tickets Tickets
0 80,561 0 50,467
1-13 110,087 264 176,455
14-30 123,205 1,032 54,672
31-60 100,606 8,806 44,564
61-100 86,284 39,205 29,014
101-200 193,410 834,253 25,255
201+ 3,967 1,150,982 1,147
Total 698,120 2,034,542 381,574
1Because of the non-disclosure agreement, I can not reveal any information about the name of
the franchise.
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In the primary market, based on the method of selling, tickets can be roughly
separated as three types: single game tickets, package tickets, and group tickets.
Table 2.1 shows the number of tickets sold in the two markets and only presents
the number of single game tickets and package tickets for the primary market.2 As
indicated in Table 2.1, over 50 percent of package tickets are sold early in the season,
about over 200 days before the game. However, on StubHub, over 50 percent of the
transactions happen within two weeks before the event. Therefore, I focus on the
data within 13 days prior to the event, and in the primary market only single game
tickets are included in the sample.
Furthermore, tickets sold on the last day (0 days prior to the game) are also
excluded for two reasons. First, the last day (0 days prior to the game) has diﬀerent
lengths of time for diﬀerent games because not all the games start at the same time
during a day. For those games starting from noon, the number of transactions is
much smaller than those starting from evening. Second, the instrumental variable I
mention in section 2.5.1 has some problems on the last day.3 As a result, I only use
the sample in 1-13 days prior to the game to estimate the demand and do the rest
of analysis.
Besides the selection of the days before the game, I exclude some tickets in some
special areas or without seats because it is diﬃcult to compare those seats with most
of the tickets in the ﬁeld. Tickets for the home opener are also excluded because
prices are signiﬁcantly higher than those in any other games. Even though all the
data are transaction data, extreme high price tickets might bias the aggregate data.
Thus I drop those tickets with prices greater than or equal to three times the face
2Adding with the number of group tickets that I see in the data will yield a number very close
to the team’s attendance; however, to avoid revealing the team’s attendance, I only list the number
of single game tickets and package tickets in Table 2.1.
3See section 2.3.2.
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value.
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics for the full sample and the sample for
estimation, including prices, days prior to the game, face values, and characteristics
in both markets. In the full sample, the mean price on StubHub is $47.76, higher than
$34.24 in the primary market. For price dispersion, prices vary not only based on
the quality of tickets in the both markets but also across diﬀerent purchasing time in
the secondary market, so the standard deviation on StubHub is $32.63, greater than
$17.92 in the primary market. Furthermore, the face value indicates the price menu
reported by the franchise in the beginning of season, but because the franchise may
change the price menu for some particular games or sections during the season, the
mean price is higher than the mean face value in the primary market. On StubHub,
the diﬀerence between the transaction price and the face value can be treated as the
markup for sellers on StubHub, and average markup is around $12.61. Moreover,
face value and distance from the seat to home plate can also represent the quality of
tickets, so the quality of tickets in the full sample is very similar in the two markets.
In addition, the front row of section dummy shows that tickets sold on StubHub have
more front row seats (9.5 percent of tickets sold), compared with those single game
tickets sold in the primary market.
If we focus on the sample in 1-13 days prior to the game, exclude those transac-
tions with extreme high prices, drop those tickets in some special areas, and exclude
the data from the home opener, the summary statistics are shown in the bottom part
of Table 2.2. The average number of transactions in the primary market is 729.26
per game, less than 1589.09 on StubHub. Consumers tend to buy tickets from the
secondary market within two weeks before the game. Furthermore, based on the face
value and the distance from the seat to home plate, the quality of tickets on StubHub
is worse than that in the primary market. Although the percentage of front row seats
11
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Standard
Obs. Mean Deviation Max Min
Full Sample
Primary Market
Price ($ per seat) 540,596 34.242 17.920 108 1
Days prior to game 540,596 65.081 57.382 245 0
Face value ($ per seat) 540,596 33.743 17.209 95 12
Distance from seat to home plate 540,596 277.786 95.043 439.3 82.62
Front row of section dummy 510,867 0.029 0.167 1 0
StubHub
Price ($ per seat) 345,207 47.758 32.628 706 0.01
Days prior to game 345,207 26.795 39.562 303 0
Face value ($ per seat) 345,207 35.150 18.977 95 12
Distance from seat to home plate 345,207 271.941 93.725 439.3 72.81
Front row of section dummy 342,236 0.095 0.293 1 0
Sample for Estimation
Primary Market
Price ($ per seat) 58,341 40.131 18.407 108 10
Days prior to game 58,341 6.148 3.943 13 1
Face value ($ per seat) 58,341 37.788 16.828 76 12
Distance from seat to home plate 58,341 250.638 89.389 424.2 129.9
Front row of section dummy 54,423 0.007 0.083 1 0
StubHub
Price ($ per seat) 127,127 39.684 22.692 225 0.01
Days prior to game 127,127 4.735 3.544 13 1
Face value ($ per seat) 127,127 33.673 17.051 76 12
Distance from seat to home plate 127,127 279.241 90.776 424.2 129.9
Front row of section dummy 126,610 0.073 0.260 1 0
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is higher on StubHub, tickets sold in the secondary market are distributed amongst
the areas with lower face values. In addition, prices in the secondary market still
vary more than those in the primary market because of the descending price trend on
StubHub. The maximum transaction price on StubHub is $225, and the minimum
one is only $0.01.
In order to reduce the categories of tickets, I group some sections and deﬁne 7
areas as Figure 2.2 shows. On the inﬁeld side, areas 1, 2, and 3 are on the ﬁrst ﬂoor,
and areas 5 and 6 are on the second ﬂoor. On the outﬁeld side, tickets are grouped
by each ﬂoor, named as area 4 and area 7. Tickets in the same area can be treated
as homogeneous goods.
Because the demand for each area is diﬀerent in the secondary market, price
patterns on StubHub vary across areas. Figure 2.3 shows the price patterns in the
two markets for areas 1, 3, 5, and 7, and the dotted lines represent 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals. For all areas, prices are decreasing over time in the secondary
market, as the evidence found in Sweeting (2012). Although the declining prices on
StubHub in Figure 2.1 can also be explained as the composition of the tickets sold,
Figure 2.3 clearly indicates that the prices in the secondary market is still declining
over time even though we control the quality of tickets.
In areas 1 and 5, Figure 2.3 shows that the price on StubHub is only lower than
that in the primary market when the event approaches. In order to sell tickets out
on StubHub, sellers might lower the price dramatically in the last few days before
the game. In area 3, the descending prices are signiﬁcantly higher than those in
the primary market except the last day. In the last day, prices in the two markets
are almost the same. In area 7, the descending prices on StubHub are higher than
prices in the primary market at any time, which might implies that the franchise
underprice this area, or some consumers have some reasons to choose a higher price
13
Figure 2.2: Area Location in the Baseball Field
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Figure 2.3: Prices for Diﬀerent Areas in the Two Markets Over Time
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on StubHub.
To estimate the demand in the two markets, I aggregate the data by area, by
market, by day prior to the game, and by game. For each game, the aggregate data
contain the average prices, quantities, and other average characteristics for 7 areas
over 13 periods. For those spots without the transaction data, tickets are assumed
unavailable at that time.
2.3.2 Other Data
Besides the transaction data, I use website viewing data to approximate the
number of consumers in the market at a given point in time. This data contain the
number of website hits on the franchise pricing pages for each game everyday. Figure
2.4 shows the number of view increases as the gameday approaches. In 10 days prior
to the game, the average view per game is only 800, but it dramatically increases to
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Figure 2.4: Average View and Quantity in Both Markets Over Time
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over 2000 on the last day before the game. Furthermore, in Figure 2.4, the average
transaction quantity per game increases over time in both markets because of the
increase in potential consumers, but the number of tickets sold in the primary market
is not as proportional as the number of potential consumers.
In addition, I collect the listing data on StubHub every day from March 25,
2011 to September 28, 2011. The data include the seat information on the buying
page, such as price, quantity, row number, and seat number. However, the StubHub
transaction data do not contain the information about seat number. The only way
to connect the StubHub transaction data with the primary market transaction data
is through the listing data. In this way, the primary market buyer information
can be used to identify the seller’s information on StubHub. Then, we can get the
information about seller’s cost shock to be the instrumental variable (See section
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2.5.1). Unfortunately, the listing data is not perfect on the day of the event4, so I
can not get the seller’s complete information for 0 days prior to the game.
2.4 Model
The model includes three parts: the demand side in the two markets, the supply
side in the secondary market, and the franchise proﬁts maximization problem. In
addition, two models are presented for the demand side. One is the static demand
model where consumers can enter the market on a given day before the game, choose
to purchase or not, and then exit the market. The other one is the dynamic demand
model which speciﬁes strategic consumers choosing the optimal time for purchasing
tickets.
2.4.1 Static Demand Model
The model follows the random utility discrete choice model. For a given game g,
there are T periods, indexed by t = {1, 2, ..., T}. Consumers start to buy tickets from
the ﬁrst period t = 1, and the game starts after the last period t = T . Consumers are
assumed to have only one unit demand, and they come into the market randomly in
some period. In each period, they can choose one of the available tickets in the market
or decide not to buy anything. Once they decide not to buy any tickets, they leave
the market forever. In the model, the market contains the primary market and the
secondary market. Consumers do not have any search cost inside the market, they
can observe all the available tickets and easily compare their prices. Furthermore,
consumers are assumed to attend the event for sure, so they do not resell their tickets
in the market.
In order to simplify the notation, I only specify the setting for one game g and
drop the subscript g. There is a set of areas j = 1, 2, ...Jt available at each period t.
4From August 2011, the listing data are not collected on the day of the event.
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For each area j, characteristic xjt and price pjt are diﬀerent in each period t. Here,
xjt contains the observed characteristics, such as dummies for ﬂoor level and the
average distance between available seats and home plate. If a consumer i buys the
ticket in area j at period t, then she gains the utility
uijt = γ0 − αpjt + xjtγ1 +Dtγ2 + ξjt + ijt, (2.1)
where Dt are a set of dummies to specify the purchasing time, ξjt is unobserved
demand shock, and ijt is an idiosyncratic taste for consumers. Because consumers
buying tickets in the same area might have various utilities depending on the time of
purchasing, the period dummies are included to control the mean utility for diﬀerent
period consumers. However, the period dummies only aﬀect the purchase of the out-
side good and do not aﬀect their decision to choose the area. Unobserved demand
shocks ξjt, such as injury news of players, is only observed by consumers. Idiosyn-
cratic taste ijt is distributed i.i.d. across time, areas, and individuals according to
a Type I extreme value distribution.
Deﬁne the mean utility of buying the ticket in area j at period t as vjt = γ0 −
αpjt+ xjtγ1 +Dtγ2 + ξjt. By integration of the idiosyncratic error term, the market
share of area j at period t is
sjt =
exp{vjt}
1 +
∑Jt
k=1 exp{vkt}
. (2.2)
Furthermore, the option of outside goods is deﬁned as j = 0, which means consumers
do not buy any tickets and leave the market. After the mean utility of buying nothing
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is normalized as 0, then the market share of outside goods is
s0t =
1
1 +
∑Jt
k=1 exp{vkt}
. (2.3)
From equation (2.2) and (2.3), the estimating equation for demand can be written
as:
ln(sjt)− ln(s0t) = vjt = γ0 − αpjt + xjtγ1 +Dtγ2 + ξjt. (2.4)
The market share of area j and the market share of outside goods can be observed
from the data; hence, the mean utility vjt can be calculated directly in the static
demand model.
2.4.2 Dynamic Demand Model
In the dynamic demand model, the only diﬀerence from the static demand model
is that consumers who do not buy a ticket in the period t < T can stay in the market
and make the decision again in the next period t + 1. The outside good option
becomes the expectation of future purchasing.
Let it = (i0t, i1t, ...iJtt) be the idiosyncratic taste for consumer i at period t
for all the areas. The decision for consumer i at time t only depends on the taste
it and the mean utility of currently available areas {vjt}Jtj=1, and the expectation of
future available tickets depends on current available information. Let Ωt be a state
variable which contains all the information related to consumer’s decision. Then the
Bellman equation can be written as
Vi(it,Ωt) = max
{
i0t + βE[Vi(it+1,Ωt+1)|Ωt], max
j=1,...,Jt
{vjt + ijt}
}
, (2.5)
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where Vi(it,Ωt) is the value function for consumer i at period t and β is the discount
factor for the future. Equation (2.5) indicates that the current value of the consumer
is to maximize the value between waiting to the next period and choosing the favorite
ticket from the available choice set.
Deﬁne the logit inclusive value as
δt = ln
( Jt∑
j=1
exp{vjt}
)
. (2.6)
The logit inclusive value captures the value of ex-ante purchasing tickets in the
market. By the assumption of Type I extreme value distribution error term, the
value function can be integrated as:
EV(Ωt) = ln
(
exp
(
βE[EV(Ωt+1)|Ωt]
)
+ exp(δt)
)
, (2.7)
where EV(Ωt) =
∫
it
V (it,Ωt) means the expectation of value function over it. Fol-
lowing the previous literature (see Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012), Melnikov
(2013), and Conlon (2012)), we can assume that inclusive value is suﬃcient for con-
sumers to make the decision, which means EV (Ωt) = EV (δt) and Prob(Ωt+1|Ωt) =
Prob(δt+1|δt). Intuitively, the inclusive value represents the situation in the mar-
ket including the number of available areas, ticket prices, and ticket characteristics
which directly aﬀect the utility; therefore, consumers only track the inclusive value
to predict the future value. One of the possible disadvantages is that prices and
characteristics might aﬀect the inclusive value in diﬀerent ways over time. As the
game day approaches, decreasing prices make the inclusive value become higher, but
fewer available tickets or worse ticket quality might cause the inclusive value to be-
come less. To model how consumers predict the future states, I simply assume that
20
consumers use the current state to predict the next state:
δt+1 = π0 + π1δt + ηt. (2.8)
Then the market share of area j at period t is
sjt =
exp{vjt}
exp
{
βE[EV(δt+1)|δt]
}
+
∑Jt
k=1 exp{vkt}
. (2.9)
The value function, equation (2.7), can also be written as:
EV(δt) = ln
(
exp
(
βE[EV(δt+1)|δt]
)
+ exp(δt)
)
. (2.10)
Deﬁne v is the vector containing all the mean value {{vjt}Jtj=1}Tt=1. Then we need two
loops to obtain the mean utility vector v. The outside loop is the contraction map-
ping based on Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman
(2012):
vnewjt = v
old
jt + ψ
(
ln
(
s¯jt
)− ln (ˆ¯sjt(vold))), ∀ j, t, (2.11)
where s¯jt is the observed market share from the data, ˆ¯sjt is the market share predicted
by the model, and ψ is generally set as 1− β. Given any value of mean utility v, we
can obtain the true mean utility v by the iteration of equation (2.11).
To predict the market share by the mean value vector v, we need the inner loop
for the value function. Given the mean value vector v, the logit inclusive value δt can
be calculated by equation (2.6) in each period t. Also, πˆ0 and πˆ1 can be estimated
by equation (2.8). Then I discretize δt into 50 grid points.
5 Based on πˆ0 and πˆ1,
5The range for δt is from min(δt)− 0.2(max(δt)−min(δt)) to max(δt) + 0.2(max(δt)−min(δt)).
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the transition matrix can be obtained for each state. Given the initial guess of the
value function EV(δt), the new value function is iterated by equation (2.10). Once
we have the true value function for each state, the market share can be predicted by
equation (2.9).
Then we can have the estimated equation as
vjt = γ0 − αpjt + xjtγ1 +Dtγ2 + ξjt, (2.12)
where vjt is solved by two iteration loops. Because I assume that consumers are
homogeneous, the random coeﬃcient term is not in the model. Therefore, I do not
need to nest these two iterations into the estimation, and the mean utility can be
obtained independently. To estimate equation (2.4) and (2.12), I use the Generalized
Method of Moment (GMM) to deal with the endogeneity problem. (See section 2.5)
2.4.3 Supply in the Secondary Market
On the supply side, there are many sellers in the secondary market. Sellers can
price dynamically over time to maximize their proﬁts, and diﬀerent kinds of sellers
might have diﬀerent strategies of pricing. In order to simplify the problem, I follow
the theoretical model in Sweeting (2012) but assume that sellers in the same area
are homogeneous.
To omit the notation for diﬀerent games, I sketch the seller problem for a given
game g. Assume in the area j at period t, there are Mjt homogeneous sellers in
this area, and there are Nt buyers in the market. The number of buyers and sellers
are assumed exogenous. In the static demand case, there is no problem to treat
the number of new coming consumers as exogenous because consumers should leave
the market after the end of period. However, when consumers are strategic, we can
not separately identify the waiting consumers and new coming consumers. The only
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possible method is to treat either the number of new coming consumers or the number
of total consumers as exogenous. Here, the easier way is to assume the number of
total consumers is Nt.
In addition, after each period t sellers have the expected value for their tickets,
denoted as EVjt+1. In the last period t = T , it can be interpreted as the scrap value
of the ticket. For instance, if the seller can not sell the ticket in the last period, she
still can attend the event directly and gain the value. In the period t < T , sellers
can have many options. She can either continue selling the ticket or decide not to
sell the ticket on StubHub. Of course, she can also decide to sell in other secondary
markets. Therefore, the expected value after the period t is not necessarily equal to
the value of the maximization problem in the beginning of the period t + 1. The
seller’s problem can be separated period by period, and the seller decides the price
in the beginning of each period t to maximize the expected proﬁts which includes
both the possible revenue in period t and the expected value after period t. Each
seller can only have one ticket, so the problem for seller k in area j can be written as
max
pkt
pktΦkt(pkt, p−kt) + (1− Φkt(pkt, p−kt))EVkt+1, (2.13)
where Φkt(pkt, p−kt) is the probability of sale and p−kt are all other prices by other
sellers in the market. Because all the sellers on StubHub are small relative to the
market, they are unlikely to have the market power. The function Φkt(.) is assumed
not aﬀected by any single seller.
If the seller k sets a higher price than the price level in area j, which is pkt > pjt,
then the probability of sale is Φkt = 0. However, if pkt = pjt for all seller k in area j,
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then the probability of sale is Φkt =
sjt(pkt,p−kt)Nt
Mjt
. The ﬁrst order condition is:
Φkt(pkt, p−kt) +
∂Φkt(pkt, p−kt)
∂pkt
(pkt − EVkt+1) = 0. (2.14)
Based on the ﬁrst order condition, each seller can choose the optimal price p∗kt:
p∗kt = EVkt+1 +
Φkt(p
∗
kt, p
∗
−kt)∣∣∣∂Φkt(p∗kt,p∗−kt)∂pkt
∣∣∣ . (2.15)
Because sellers in area j are homogeneous, the optimal prices should be the same in
area j, which is p∗kt = p
∗
jt for all seller k in area j. The probability of sale should be
Φkt =
sjt(pjt,p−jt)Nt
Mjt
≡ Φjt because every seller in the same area equally share the same
probability of sale. The marginal probability of sale ∂Φkt
∂pkt
can be assumed equal to
∂Φjt
∂pjt
if all the sellers in the same area can expect to change the price simultaneously.
Therefore, all the ﬁrst order conditions at period t can be reduced as Jt ﬁrst order
conditions only for diﬀerent areas:
p∗jt = EVjt+1 +
sjt(p
∗
jt, p
∗
−jt)∣∣∣∂sjt(p∗jt,p∗−jt)∂pjt
∣∣∣ ∀ j = 1, 2, ...Jt, (2.16)
where sjt(p
∗
jt, p
∗
−jt) is the equilibrium market share of area j at period t, and p−jt
are prices for other areas. Intuitively, the price for area j at period t only depends
on the expected value EVjt+1 and the elasticity in the market. Empirically we can
recover the seller’s expected value after using the data to calculate the elasticity of
demand.
2.4.4 Franchise Problem
In this section, I focus on the revenue from single-game tickets. Theoretically the
franchise can set the prices for all of the areas and periods in the primary market,
24
denoted as
{{pjt}j∈J0t}Tt=1, where J0t = { j | ∀j in the primary market at time t}. In
the real world the franchise does not price dynamically over time,
{{pjt}j∈J0t}Tt=1 =
{pj}j∈J0 ∀t, where J0 = { j | ∀j in the primary market}. The revenue under the
original price menu {pj}j∈J0 should be
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈J0
Ntsjt(pjt, p−jt)pjt. (2.17)
If the franchise can change the price without any cost, the maximization problem for
the franchise is
max
{{pjt}j∈J0t}Tt=1
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈J0t
Ntsjt(pjt, p−jt)pjt. (2.18)
We ignore the capacity constraint for the franchise because in the data tickets are
always available in all areas in the primary market. However, it is diﬃcult to solve
this maximization problem. In the counterfactual experiment in section 2.6, I use a
new price menu to calculate the revenue and compare that with the original one.
2.5 Estimation and Results
2.5.1 Endogeneity Problem
The demand can be estimated by equation (2.4) and (2.12), but the unobserved
demand shock ξjt might be correlated with the price pjt in some case. In the primary
market, the price variation primarily depends on the quality of seats and the oppo-
nents of games. For instance, facing a popular opponent, the franchise can expect a
higher demand and set a higher price. Once we control the location of the seat and
the information of the game, the unobserved demand shock ξjt should not correlate
with the price because the price is always set by the franchise in the beginning of
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the season. However, in the secondary market, equilibrium price correlates with the
unobserved demand shock ξjt even though we have already controlled for seat qual-
ity and opponent characteristics. For instance, some news about a player before the
game might change the demand and the equilibrium price.
In the previous literature, it is common to use cost shifters to identify the demand.
Here, I use the proportion of sellers buying tickets in the primary market by package
prices as the instrumental variable for the demand in the secondary market. The
instrumental variable varies primarily across diﬀerent areas and diﬀerent games but
does not vary substantially over time. From the data, those sellers buying tickets by
package prices do price lower because they have lower opportunity cost than others.
They have already used the cheaper price to buy tickets in the primary market. Also,
they can bear the loss in the following games if they have already sold tickets for some
popular games in higher prices. As a result, for those areas with higher proportion
of sellers holding package tickets, the average transaction price is also lower.
The exclusion restriction of this instrumental variable strategy is that there is no
correlation between the cost shifter and the unobserved demand shock. For those
package buyers in the primary market, they always buy tickets at the beginning of
the season. The exclusion restriction would be called into question if sellers decide
to resell their tickets based on the information of the unobserved demand shock.
From the data I can observe, sellers almost always list their tickets very early in the
season on StubHub. Thus, the proportion of sellers as package buyers in the primary
market could be the potential instrumental variable to identify the demand.
2.5.2 Demand Estimation Results
After the mean utility vjt is recovered by the observed market share, the un-
observed demand shock ξjt = vjt − (γ0 − αpjt + xjtγ1 + Dtγ2) can be written as
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ξjt(α,γ), where γ = (γ0,γ1,γ2)
′. Deﬁne ξ0(α,γ) as a vector containing all the
unobserved demand shock in the primary market
{{ξjt(α,γ)}j∈J0t}Tt=1 and ξ1(α,γ)
as a vector containing all the unobserved demand shock in the secondary market{{ξjt(α,γ)}j∈J1t}Tt=1, where J1t = { j | ∀j on StubHub at time t}. Furthermore, de-
ﬁne z0 as a matrix containing all the exogeneous variables in the primary market and
z1 as a matrix containing the instrumental variable and other exogeneous variables
in the secondary market. The sample moment condition is
m(α,γ) =
⎡
⎢⎣ 1n0z′0ξ0(α,γ)
1
n1
z′1ξ1(α,γ)
⎤
⎥⎦ , (2.19)
where n0 and n1 are the number of observations in the primary market and in the
secondary market. Then the GMM estimator is
(
αˆ, γˆ
)
= argmin
α,γ
m(α,γ)′Wm(α,γ), (2.20)
where W is a weighting matrix.
The estimated parameters are shown in Table 2.3. The ﬁrst column contains the
parameter estimates and standard errors from the static demand model, and the
last two columns provide the results of the dynamic demand model. The diﬀerence
between the last two columns is whether dummies for days prior to the game are
included in the model or not. In the static demand model, there are two reasons
to include dummies for diﬀerent days. First, consumers coming into the market on
diﬀerent days might have diﬀerent mean utilities of buying tickets. Second, dummies
for diﬀerent days can be used to control the demand change over time. However,
in the dynamic model, consumers are assumed to enter the market in the early
beginning, and the waiting behavior of consumers is sketched by the model. There
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Table 2.3: Demand Estimates
Static Model Dynamic Model
(1) (2) (3)
Seat quality
Price ($) -0.011 -0.074 -0.078
[0.001]** [0.013]** [0.014]**
Distance from seat to home plate (ft) -0.001 -0.008 -0.008
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
First ﬂoor dummy 0.193 1.488 1.558
relative to the second ﬂoor [0.031]** [0.283]** [0.287]**
Game Information
Against divisional opponent 0.098 1.916 1.923
[0.020]** [0.206]** [0.206]**
Against league opponent -0.128 -1.187 -1.178
[0.029]** [0.256]** [0.256]**
Relative to weekday game
Saturday game -0.405 -7.878 -7.881
[0.029]** [0.221]** [0.222]**
Sunday game -0.227 -2.796 -2.796
[0.025]** [0.203]** [0.203]**
Secondary market dummy 0.462 0.261 0.274
relative to the primary market [0.020]** [0.177] [0.177]
Include dummies for Yes Yes No
days prior to game
Constant -3.341 25.021 24.903
[0.096]** [0.924]** [0.935]**
Observations 10,923 10,923 10,923
Standard errors in brackets, * signiﬁcant at 5%; **signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 2.4: The Eﬀect on Utility in Terms of Dollars
Static Model Dynamic Model
Distance from seat to home plate (every 100 feet) −9.09 −10.26
First ﬂoor relative to the second ﬂoor 17.55 19.97
Against divisional opponent 8.91 24.65
Against league opponent −11.63 −15.10
Saturday game relative to weekday game −36.82 −101.04
Sunday game relative to weekday game −20.64 −35.85
is no need to include dummies for diﬀerent days before the event. We can see that
the estimated parameters are really similar between the second column and the
third column. Those dummies included in the second column are all statistically
insigniﬁcant.
In the static demand estimation, price and distance from seat to home plate neg-
atively aﬀect the mean utility, and the ﬁrst ﬂoor contributes positively to the mean
utility. The average own price elasticity is around −0.42. Using the coeﬃcient on
other attributes divided by the coeﬃcient on price, we can measure other attributes
of seats by dollars, as shown in Table 2.4. On average, the eﬀect of distance on utility
is around -$9.09 every 100 feet from home plate. Sitting on the ﬁrst ﬂoor have a
utility gain around $17.55, relative to those on the second ﬂoor. For instance, seats
in area 3 and area 5 have similar distance from home plate, but areas 3 and 5 are
on the ﬁrst and second ﬂoor, respectively. Consequently, the average price of seats
in area 3 is around $10 higher than that in area 5.
In addition, diﬀerent games also contribute diﬀerently to the mean utility. Rela-
tive to opponents in the same league, consumers value games against the other league
$11.64 higher. Conditional on opponents in the same league, facing opponents in the
same division can increase the consumer’s utility by $8.91. Besides the diﬀerent
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opponents, the event time can also aﬀect the mean utility. Because the utility of
outside good for games on the weekend is higher than that during the weekday, con-
sumers who attend the game on the weekend have lower utility, compared with those
who attend the weekday games. Furthermore, purchasing in the diﬀering markets
can also determine the mean utility of consumers. People prefer go to the secondary
market to buy tickets because the secondary market dummy positively contributes
to the utility, and the value of coeﬃcient can be explained as the brand loyalty to
StubHub.
Compared with the static demand model, coeﬃcients estimated by the dynamic
model in column (3) all have the same sign as those in the static demand model.
However, the coeﬃcient of price is −0.078, which is more sensitive to the utility
than that in the static demand model. Similarly, the eﬀect of distance on utility is
around -$10.26 every 100 feet from home plate. Consumers value sitting in the lower
deck/ﬁrst ﬂoor nearly $20 more than sitting in the upper deck. Attributes of games
also aﬀect the mean utility as that in the static demand model.
Moreover, the secondary market dummy plays an insigniﬁcant role on the dy-
namic demand estimation. The reason might be that prices in the two markets do
not have signiﬁcant diﬀerence for consumers in the dynamic view. In the static
model, there exists the price gap between two markets in each period, so it is nec-
essary to use the secondary market dummy to explain the market preference. In
the dynamic model, consumers can forecast the future price and buy tickets in the
future, and prices in the two markets might be similar in the future. Thus, there is
no price diﬀerence in the two markets if we consider the prices over time.
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2.6 Counterfactual Experiment
This section presents the simulated results when the franchise changes the uniform
price schedule into the descending prices as the event approaches. To understand
the implication of new prices provided by the franchise, the responses of consumers
and secondary market sellers should be considered. Based on the estimated demand
system and the behavior of sellers in the secondary market, the new equilibrium can
be obtained, and the new revenue for the franchise can be compared with the original
revenue.
In the demand side, I assume that the taste of consumers does not change, so
the market share can be predicted by the estimated demand system even though
some characteristics are changed exogenously. For the supply side in the secondary
market, sellers follow the expected proﬁt maximization problem as equation (2.13)
to decide the price in each period. From the data, the expected value for sellers in
area j after the period t can be obtained by equation (2.16). In the counterfactual
experiment, I assume that the expected values for sellers after each period are the
same as before. Then sellers in the secondary market can change their prices in
response to the new demand.
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 present the expected values for sellers after each day prior
to the game. For each period and each area, the expected values are solved game
by game, and the table shows the mean and standard deviation of expected values
for 80 games. For those games with higher prices, sellers also have higher expected
values.
Furthermore, I do not solve the expected value period by period, using the as-
sumption that the last period’s expected value is zero. Therefore, the expected value
might be positive or negative, only representing the relative value over time for sell-
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Table 2.5: Expected Value for Sellers in the Secondary Market Over Time (Recovered
Using the Static Demand Model)
Days Area
Prior to Game 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 -41.75 -54.16 -63.13 -67.49 -72.80 -80.22 -72.56
(20.09) (17.30) (12.45) (13.61) (9.35) (9.37) (10.77)
2 -37.62 -51.09 -59.89 -64.17 -69.91 -77.98 -69.13
(21.68) (15.99) (13.08) (12.69) (10.30) (9.09) (10.57)
3 -32.53 -48.16 -57.03 -61.81 -68.47 -76.81 -68.80
(21.49) (16.61) (13.01) (12.21) (9.59) (9.63) (10.90)
4 -30.00 -47.15 -55.70 -60.96 -65.58 -76.12 -66.51
(23.52) (18.63) (13.39) (14.11) (8.36) (9.93) (10.72)
5 -28.68 -43.94 -54.95 -59.53 -66.04 -75.90 -66.95
(22.37) (17.03) (15.18) (13.48) (9.80) (10.02) (10.50)
6 -28.17 -44.93 -53.99 -59.55 -65.25 -75.22 -64.67
(23.49) (18.18) (14.57) (13.45) (9.08) (9.44) (12.30)
7 -27.37 -43.92 -53.20 -59.11 -66.81 -75.08 -65.63
(23.96) (16.68) (15.74) (13.21) (10.94) (9.62) (12.32)
8 -23.54 -42.29 -51.26 -56.34 -63.11 -74.48 -63.52
(21.80) (20.48) (15.17) (13.61) (9.56) (9.50) (11.20)
9 -22.48 -41.38 -49.57 -56.23 -63.95 -73.47 -63.65
(24.49) (18.37) (14.07) (12.62) (9.31) (9.16) (10.83)
10 -20.54 -41.57 -48.12 -55.93 -62.52 -73.49 -62.78
(27.54) (19.32) (15.41) (13.93) (11.77) (9.12) (11.24)
11 -24.24 -37.78 -44.32 -54.63 -61.64 -72.98 -63.03
(21.51) (17.05) (17.54) (13.35) (11.55) (9.48) (9.81)
12 -23.64 -35.99 -49.63 -56.76 -61.21 -72.30 -60.74
(24.31) (19.98) (16.00) (13.17) (12.79) (10.39) (11.28)
13 -22.33 -38.91 -49.54 -57.32 -62.89 -73.55 -61.95
(22.79) (19.32) (15.03) (14.65) (13.69) (10.96) (12.39)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Expected Value for Sellers in the Secondary Market Over Time (Recovered
Using the Dynamic Demand Model)
Days Area
Prior to Game 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 41.05 28.29 18.99 15.50 8.77 3.29 9.13
(19.09) (16.53) (11.94) (12.47) (9.42) (8.32) (10.68)
2 44.89 30.97 21.90 18.26 11.68 4.78 12.41
(20.81) (15.49) (12.87) (12.06) (10.34) (8.50) (10.40)
3 49.55 34.17 24.56 20.58 13.21 5.97 12.63
(21.04) (15.65) (12.67) (11.62) (9.50) (8.40) (10.73)
4 52.14 34.87 25.87 21.28 15.81 6.56 14.97
(22.52) (17.63) (13.01) (13.85) (8.27) (8.67) (10.42)
5 53.20 37.85 26.67 22.60 15.15 6.88 14.42
(21.77) (16.33) (14.57) (12.79) (9.73) (8.41) (10.44)
6 53.96 36.89 27.45 22.47 15.95 7.08 16.52
(22.90) (17.47) (13.92) (13.20) (9.16) (9.16) (12.11)
7 54.61 37.92 28.08 23.15 14.49 7.49 15.68
(23.21) (16.09) (15.55) (13.05) (10.94) (8.99) (12.19)
8 58.26 39.36 30.03 25.55 18.06 7.74 17.63
(21.13) (19.80) (14.79) (13.53) (9.57) (8.64) (11.21)
9 59.06 40.18 31.74 25.75 17.34 8.43 17.53
(23.88) (17.72) (13.80) (12.08) (9.33) (8.66) (10.61)
10 60.88 39.93 33.10 25.78 18.57 8.68 18.27
(27.05) (19.08) (15.22) (13.60) (11.58) (8.63) (11.04)
11 57.41 43.52 36.96 27.02 19.43 9.25 18.21
(20.79) (16.95) (16.92) (12.55) (11.38) (8.07) (9.58)
12 58.09 45.27 31.67 25.04 20.00 9.87 20.44
(23.43) (19.72) (15.53) (12.09) (12.09) (8.64) (10.69)
13 59.50 42.67 31.74 24.46 18.13 8.69 19.19
(21.74) (18.78) (14.84) (13.79) (13.35) (9.17) (11.99)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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ers. As indicated in Table 2.5, the expected values calculated by the static demand
model are all negative, but those calculated by the dynamic demand model are all
positive. The patterns in the two kinds of demand model are quite similar because
sellers in the secondary market face the same proﬁt maximization problem no matter
how consumers behave diﬀerently in the demand side.
For diﬀerent areas, sellers with higher quality tickets, such as tickets in area 1,
have higher expected values. In addition, for diﬀerent days prior to the game, sellers
have declining expected values when the event approaches. Because of the limited
time to sell, sellers have less opportunity cost over time. That is the reason why the
price trend is declining in the secondary market, as mentioned in Sweeting (2012).
The method I use to simulate the new equilibrium is to calculate both the new
market share of diﬀerent areas in the two markets and the new prices in the secondary
market repeatedly. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst step is to predict the new market share
of products by the estimated demand equation after the franchise change the price
in the primary market. Second, sellers in the secondary market adjust their prices
after knowing the new market share of products. Then for consumers, prices are
changed again, and they change the decision again. After the ﬁrst step and the
second step are repeated several times, the new equilibrium can be obtained. In the
new equilibrium, sellers still need to satisfy equation (2.16) to price optimally, and
consumers follow either the static demand system or the dynamic demand system.
To simplify the counterfactual experiment, some other characteristics of seats
except prices are assumed to be the same. This assumption might not be true
because the quality of seats might be diﬀerent after consumers buy more or less in
the previous period. In the real data, some characteristics, such as the distance from
the seat to home plate, do not vary signiﬁcantly over time. The most important
characteristic for the counterfactual experiment is price; therefore, price is assumed
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to be the only endogenous variable that should be solved.
Instead of simulating 80 games, I use the average of 80 games’ data as one rep-
resentative game to analyze the implication of price change. In diﬀerent games, the
franchise might face diﬀerent situations in the secondary market. For instance, for
some popular games, prices might increase even in the last few days before the event.
In that case, the franchise might not need the descending price to earn more proﬁts.
However, the case we might be interested in is the standard game with a descending
price trend in the secondary market. Thus, I use the average data to construct the
representative game to do the counterfactual experiment.
The disadvantage of using the average data is that simulated data might not be
accurate because the average data does not represent any speciﬁc game. In order to
understand the implication of price change, I simulate two cases for the franchise:
one is simulated by the uniform price over time, and the other is simulated by the
descending price over time. The revenue diﬀerence in these two models can be
explained as the implication of price change.
Table 2.7 presents the price implication simulated by the static demand model.
The revenue in the true data is calculated directly by the average price and the
total quantity in each area, and the total revenue is around $40,706 for one game.
Compared with the true data, the total revenue simulated by the original uniform
prices is quite similar, about $40,398. However, for diﬀerent areas, quantities might
be over or under predicted by the estimated model. If we want to understand the new
price implication, the best way is to compare two simulated results by the model.
If the franchise uses the descending prices over time with maximum prices close
to the price level in the secondary market and with minimum prices same as the
original price level, the number of sales for each area decreases because of higher
prices. However, the total revenue can be increased to $43,197, which is increased by
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$2,799 per game, around 6.93% of original revenues. The equilibrium prices in the
secondary market go up for each area. Intuitively, consumers come into the market
and only compare those available seats in the current period, so the franchise can
price similarly to the price in the secondary market. Even though the market share
goes down, the total revenues still increase because of higher prices.
The result predicted by the dynamic demand model is a little bit diﬀerent from
that predicted by the static model. In the dynamic demand model, consumers can
predict the future price trend and make a decision of purchasing. In other words,
consumers can expect the lower price in the primary market in the future when the
franchise uses the descending price trend. Therefore, we expect that the revenue
gains in the dynamic demand model would be less than those in the static demand
model. As indicated in Table 2.8, compared with the revenue simulated by the
uniform price, $40,990, the revenue simulated by the descending price, $42,492, only
increased by $1,503 per game. This is around 3.67% of the original revenue, which
is smaller than that in the static demand model. In particular, the franchise has
the revenue loss in some areas, such as areas 1, 2, and 5. To sum up, the type of
consumers does aﬀect the magnitude of dynamic pricing by the franchise, but overall
the eﬀect of dynamic pricing is positive on franchise revenue.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I use Major League Baseball ticket data both in the primary
market and in StubHub to study how the franchise can price dynamically over time
to increase the revenue. I ﬁnd that the revenue for the franchise can be increased
if the franchise uses the descending price instead of uniform price over time. Even
though the number of tickets sold decreases, the revenue can still be increased by
higher prices in the early days before the event.
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Two diﬀerent kinds of demand systems are applied to study the eﬀect of dy-
namic pricing. One is the static demand model, and the other one is the dynamic
demand model. In the static demand model, consumers can not make the decision
intertemporally, so the franchise can have more revenue gain by the descending price
trend because consumers do not compare prices over time. However, in the dynamic
demand model, consumers can stay in the market and predict the future available
tickets, so the franchise has less revenues than in the static demand model. Of course,
compared with the uniform price, the dynamic pricing can increase the revenue in
both cases. By the counterfactual experiment, the revenue for the franchise can be
increased by around 6.93% if consumers are assumed not strategic in both markets.
If the consumers are strategic in waiting for lower prices, the revenue for the franchise
can only be increased by around 3.67%.
In addition, this chapter provides a method for the franchise considering the
secondary market reaction to study the price implication. The model captures the
competition between two markets and the response of sellers in the secondary market;
therefore, it also can be applied for any other industry with the following charac-
teristics: perishable goods selling in a limited time and lots of sellers in a prevalent
secondary market. So facing the popular secondary market competition, those fran-
chises in any kinds of sports leagues can obtain more ticket revenue by implementing
dynamic pricing for their tickets. The future research can extend this model in two
diﬀerent directions. First, it is worth discussing more comprehensive price schedule
for diﬀerent types of games to further increase the revenue for the franchise. Second,
considering the eﬀect of season ticket can make the franchise understand more about
the cost of dynamic pricing.
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3. PRICING STRATEGIES FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF SELLERS ON
STUBHUB
3.1 Introduction
New trading platforms on the internet provide customers with opportunities to
trade tickets online. In the sports ticket market, there are many famous online
secondary markets, including eBay and StubHub. Before the game day, the reseller
can post a listing with all the ticket information including a listing price and then
adjust the price everyday until the game. Diﬀerent types of resellers face diﬀerent
concerns in determining listing prices. This chapter aims to study how these diﬀerent
types of resellers in the secondary market price their tickets dynamically over time
before the game.
Compared with eBay, StubHub has become the more professional platform for
selling sports tickets. For each venue and game, StubHub has diﬀerent web pages
with detailed stadium map to show where your tickets will be in relation to the
ﬁeld. This allows sellers to list their tickets easily and for consumers to search the
tickets with a clear understanding of where their seats will be. In order to attract the
sellers and ensure them they can make a proﬁt, StubHub provides the comprehensive
transaction records for the seller to set up the initial price, and the seller can easily
change the listing price at any time before the game. Unlike eBay which reveals
the rating of the sellers, no information about each seller is provided on StubHub.
StubHub also takes a commission after the ticket is sold.
In this chapter, I use both the listing and transaction data on StubHub for the
home games of one anonymous Major League Baseball team to investigate the pricing
strategies of those sellers. Figure 3.1 shows the average listing and transaction prices
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Figure 3.1: Listing and Transaction Prices Over Time
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for the two weeks before the game. Both the listing and transaction prices decrease
over time until the game day. Compared with the face value, the average listing price
is around two times face value two weeks before the game day, and then it falls to
the face value on the last day. Most of the sellers change the prices frequently as the
game day approaches. Figure 3.2 presents the average number of tickets available
and the actual transaction quantities per game over time. The number of tickets
listed per game is between 2000 and 2500, and most of the sellers post their listings
earlier. As the game day approaches, the number of tickets available decreases, and
the number of transactions increases.
Not all the sellers have the same purpose in selling their tickets. Some might
want to sell their tickets simply because they cannot attend the game, yet some
sellers might want to make proﬁts through the online secondary market. Therefore,
41
Figure 3.2: Listing and Transaction Quantities Over Time
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heterogeneous sellers can have diﬀerent pricing strategies in diﬀerent aspects. I have
classiﬁed the sellers into two groups: single sellers and brokers. Those who sell tickets
only in one or two games during the whole season are deﬁned as the single sellers,
and those sellers who sell many tickets in one game and sell tickets in most of the
games in the season are deﬁned as brokers. Because the data allow me to identify
how many tickets they buy in the primary market, the two types of sellers can be
classiﬁed according to the detailed purchasing information.
Comparing the price levels over time for the two types of sellers, I ﬁnd that the
listing prices set by the brokers are relatively lower than those set by the single
sellers on the ﬁnal day. However, on other days before the game, the brokers prices
are signiﬁcantly higher than those of the single sellers even though the quality of
tickets is controlled.
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Having said that, only comparing the price level is not enough. I also estimate the
probability of sale for each listing on each day to calculate the optimal prices. The
optimal prices vary depending on the days before the game and the seats relation to
the ﬁeld. The brokers tend to price more optimally with less expected proﬁt losses
on the last day than do the single sellers. Beyond that, the two types of sellers have
similar expected proﬁt losses on other days before the game.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the
literature related to dynamic pricing. Section 3.3 summarizes the data I use in this
chapter. Section 3.4 presents the model for estimating the probability of sale and
calculating the optimal prices. Section 3.5 shows the results. Section 3.6 concludes
the research.
3.2 Literature Review
In this section, I brieﬂy review the literature on dynamic pricing, which is also
called revenue management in some economics and marketing literature.
Monopolistic dynamic pricing models, starting with Gallego and van Ryzin (1994),
consider how a monopoly ﬁrm sell perishable goods in a limited time under stochas-
tic demand. Customers are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process, and
the monopoly ﬁrm decides the price for each period to maximize the revenue. The
optimal pricing strategy can be characterized as a function of the inventory and time
left in the horizon (Bitran and Mondschein, 1997). Bitran and Caldentey (2003)
and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) provide a comprehensive survey to classify
diﬀerent models. Zhao and Zheng (2000) extend the model by considering the gener-
alized demand system with consumers whose reservation price distribution changes
over time.
Aside from the monopolistic dynamic pricing models, there is an extensive lit-
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erature on competitive revenue management. Netessine and Shumsky (2005) study
a static quantity-based competition between two airlines. Prices are the same for
each airline, but the airlines need to decide how many seats to reserve for higher-
fare passengers. Perakis and Sood (2006) present a multiple-period pricing model
to characterize the dynamic pricing problem under oligopolistic competition. Lin
and Sibdari (2009) study a discrete-time model under the multinomial logit demand,
and they proves the existence of Nash equilibrium when the inventory levels for
each ﬁrm are assumed as public information. Xu and Hopp (2006) use a continuous
model to study oligopolistic competition, and they establish a weak perfect Bayesian
equilibrium for the pricing game. In addition, dynamic pricing under competition
can also be extended to diﬀerent directions, such as capacity constraint (Mart´ınez-
de Albe´niz and Talluri, 2011) and strategic consumers (Levin, McGill, and Nediak,
2009; Deneckere and Peck, 2012).
Empirical literature on dynamic pricing also refers to price discrimination. How-
ever, most of the empirical studies focus on airline markets. For instance, Escobari
(2012) ﬁnds that the price increases as the inventory decreases, and the price de-
creases while there is less time to sell. Furthermore, literature also indicates that
businessmen and leisure travelers are two types of consumers for the ﬁrm to enact
price discrimination. In the hotel industry, Lee, Garrow, Higbie, Keskinocak, and
Koushik (2011) ﬁnd that the price does not increase as the arrival date approaches.
In the apparel industry, Heching, Gallego, and van Ryzin (2002) ﬁnd that smaller
mark-down pricing can raise the revenue signiﬁcantly in the early sales season, but
Soysal and Krishnamurthi (2012) show that strategic consumers delay their pur-
chases and lower the retailer’s revenues. Facing strategic consumers, retail revenues
are 9% lower than they would have been while consumers are non-strategic. In the
sports ticket secondary market, Sweeting (2012) ﬁnds that prices are decreasing over
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time as the game date approaches, and the sellers lower the price because of the
decreasing opportunity cost of holding tickets. Moreover, he uses data to test how
accurately dynamic pricing models describe sellers’ behavior, and he proves that sim-
plest dynamic pricing models can ﬁt the behavior of sellers very well, and consumers
are not strategic in buying tickets in the secondary market.
The analysis in this chapter is similar to that of Sweeting (2012), but the study
further discusses the heterogeneity of sellers. Most of the literature assumes that
sellers price optimally based on the remaining horizon. However, diﬀerent types of
sellers might have diﬀerent pricing decisions which cause them to deviate from the
optimal strategies. Therefore, this chapter uses the comprehensive data to answer
this question.
3.3 Data
The data I use contain all the listing and transaction information on StubHub
from March 25, 2011 to September 28, 2011 for some home events of one anonymous
Major League Baseball franchise in 2011 season.1 Because of the detailed primary
market transaction data, the seller can be identiﬁed if the listing contains the speciﬁc
seat information. The listing data are observed daily on StubHub.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the information of listings on StubHub,
including the listing prices, days prior to the game, sold status, face values, and other
characteristics for quality. Each observation is an available seat daily observed on
StubHub within two weeks before the game. Because the seller on StubHub tends to
set a higher price in the beginning and lower the price everyday until the game. The
mean listing price is $55.97, which is higher than the mean face value, $35.63. The
listing prices vary based on both the quality of tickets and the timing of listing. The
1In order to have all the listings until the day of the event, only 31 home events are included in
the data. Most of the games happened in the first half of the season before August.
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standard deviation of listing prices is $33.41 making it greater than the standard
deviation of face values. The quality characteristics include the distance from seat
to home plate, row number, and front row of section dummy. In addition, not all
of the listings reveal the seat number, so only parts of the listings can be identiﬁed
by the purchasing records in the primary market. Approximately 77.1% of listings
allow us to identify the information of sellers.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Listings
Standard
Obs. Mean Deviation Max Min
Listing prices ($ per seat) 973,347 55.970 33.441 449 0.01
Days prior to game 973,347 7.537 4.123 14 0
Listing sold dummy 973,347 0.056 0.231 1 0
Face value ($ per seat) 973,347 35.627 18.997 95 12
Distance from seat to home plate 973,347 269.749 95.306 439.3 72.81
Row numbers 973,347 9.431 7.959 41 1
Front row of section dummy 973,347 0.102 0.303 1 0
With account information 973,347 0.771 0.420 1 0
Because the primary market transaction data include comprehensive information
of purchasing, we can understand how many tickets sellers bought in this season,
what kinds of channels they used to buy tickets in the primary market, the prices
they pay for tickets, and the zip code they live in. Table 3.2 shows the summary
statistics for those identiﬁed sellers where each observation is a seller observed on
StubHub. The total number of identiﬁed sellers is 8,606. Some of the sellers only
have tickets in one or two games, but some have tickets in almost every game in the
season. The average number of games sellers have tickets is around 37.59, and the
average number of tickets they have in one season is around 166.16. However, not
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Sellers
Standard
Obs. Mean Deviation Max Min
Number of games holding tickets 8,606 37.585 31.546 81 1
Number of tickets in one season 8,606 166.159 481.758 33,002 1
Number of listings listed 8,606 12.801 32.494 847 1
Number of tickets listed 8,606 39.757 147.695 6,481 1
Buying tickets
in the primary market by
single game tickets 8,606 0.275 0.446 1 0
package tickets 8,606 0.467 0.499 1 0
group tickets 8,606 0.030 0.170 1 0
multiple types with package 8,606 0.214 0.410 1 0
multiple types without package 8,606 0.006 0.074 1 0
three mixed types 8,606 0.010 0.099 1 0
Distance from home
to stadium (miles) 5,770 112.628 274.471 1,866 0.000457
Single sellers 8,606 0.603 0.489 1 0
Brokers 8,606 0.003 0.056 1 0
all their tickets are listed to resell on StubHub. The average number of listings in
one season on StubHub is around 12.80, with about 39.76 tickets for one seller. The
most active seller posts 6,481 tickets in 61 games using 847 listings.
In addition, people can buy tickets in the primary market through three diﬀerent
avenues: single game tickets, package tickets, and group tickets. In Table 3.2, 46.7%
of the sellers buy the package tickets and resell parts of their tickets on StubHub, and
21.4% of sellers buy tickets by the multiple types, including the package tickets. This
means the tickets on StubHub are mostly from the package tickets. Furthermore,
27.5% of the sellers buy the single game tickets in the primary market. For various
reasons, the sellers may have diﬀerent pricing strategies. Although prices in the
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primary market are considered as sunk costs for the sellers, diﬀerent types of the
tickets might also reveal some information about the sellers. For those sellers who
want to gain the proﬁts through the resale, they need to consider using a lower cost
to buy tickets in the primary market. However, for those who simply cannot attend
the game, this may not have been a consideration when purchasing.
In order to classify sellers more robustly, I use records from the whole season to
deﬁne the two types of sellers more speciﬁcally. The single sellers have fewer than 5
listings on StubHub per season; the brokers have more than 200 listings and sell over
70% of their tickets. By the deﬁnition, Table 3.2 shows that around 60% of sellers
are the single sellers, while only 27 sellers ﬁt into the brokers category (0.3% of all
the sellers). Although the number of the brokers is small, they have many listings in
the market. Among the 27,837 listings on StubHub, there are 2,540 listings from the
brokers (9.12% of all the listings), and there are 2,778 listings from the single sellers
(9.98% of all the listings).
Figure 3.3 shows the median listing prices, which are not adjusted by quality, for
the single sellers and brokers within two weeks before the game. On the last day, the
median listing prices for both types of sellers are close to the face value. However,
on other days prior to the game, the price levels for the two types of sellers vary.
Prices for the brokers are systematically 0.5 times face value higher than those for
the single sellers. The median price for the brokers is about two times the face value
two weeks prior to the game, whereas the median price for the single sellers only
starts from around 1.5 times the face value.
Table 3.3 represents the regression results after adjusting for quality by controlling
for the distance from seat to home plate, row number, front row of section dummy,
area dummies, and game dummies. The ﬁrst two columns list the regression results
without the quality adjustment. Those sellers not speciﬁed as single sellers or brokers
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Table 3.3: Prices Diﬀerence Between Single Sellers and Brokers Over Time
Dependent Variable: Listing Prices
Compared with the benchmark (1) (2)
Days prior to game Single sellers Brokers Single sellers Brokers
0 -0.00229 -0.00993 0.0843*** -0.171***
[0.0156] [0.0132] [0.0139] [0.0118]
1 -0.0622*** 0.183*** -0.0857*** 0.194***
[0.0210] [0.0174] [0.0187] [0.0155]
2 -0.0992*** 0.244*** -0.111*** 0.270***
[0.0205] [0.0169] [0.0183] [0.0150]
3 -0.106*** 0.243*** -0.131*** 0.282***
[0.0205] [0.0166] [0.0182] [0.0148]
4 -0.104*** 0.221*** -0.139*** 0.265***
[0.0205] [0.0164] [0.0182] [0.0146]
5 -0.102*** 0.187*** -0.137*** 0.234***
[0.0207] [0.0162] [0.0184] [0.0144]
6 -0.103*** 0.199*** -0.129*** 0.250***
[0.0208] [0.0162] [0.0185] [0.0144]
7 -0.100*** 0.216*** -0.126*** 0.267***
[0.0210] [0.0161] [0.0187] [0.0143]
8 -0.0836*** 0.197*** -0.112*** 0.245***
[0.0212] [0.0160] [0.0188] [0.0142]
9 -0.0935*** 0.260*** -0.118*** 0.308***
[0.0212] [0.0159] [0.0189] [0.0142]
10 -0.106*** 0.286*** -0.129*** 0.336***
[0.0214] [0.0159] [0.0190] [0.0142]
11 -0.102*** 0.331*** -0.129*** 0.376***
[0.0216] [0.0159] [0.0192] [0.0141]
12 -0.0997*** 0.340*** -0.128*** 0.385***
[0.0216] [0.0159] [0.0192] [0.0141]
13 -0.101*** 0.333*** -0.126*** 0.380***
[0.0217] [0.0159] [0.0193] [0.0141]
14 -0.0931*** 0.404*** -0.125*** 0.451***
[0.0219] [0.0159] [0.0194] [0.0141]
Constant 1.099*** 1.758***
[0.00503] [0.00835]
Quality control Yes
Observations 750,727 750,727
R-squared 0.073 0.267
Standard errors in brackets
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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Figure 3.3: Median Listing Prices for Single Sellers and Brokers
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
Li
st
in
g 
Pr
ice
s 
(R
ela
tiv
e t
o F
ac
ev
alu
e)
051015
Days Prior to Game
Single Sellers Brokers
are called the benchmark group. Compared with the benchmark group, there is no
diﬀerence for the single sellers or the brokers on the last day. However, during days
2-14 prior to the game, the single sellers have a lower price level as shown in Figure
3.3, and the brokers have an overall higher price level.
The third and fourth columns represent the results after the quality control. The
result indicates that on the last day, the prices listed by the single sellers are around
8% of face value higher than those by the benchmark group, and the prices listed by
the brokers are 17% of face value lower than those by the benchmark group. Thus,
considering the quality control, the brokers do price around 25% of face value lower
than the single sellers on the last day. However, on other days before the game, the
prices for brokers are relatively higher than those for the single sellers even after we
have controlled the quality of the tickets.
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3.4 Model
3.4.1 Seller’s Problem
For a given game g, there are T periods, indexed by t={1,2,...T}, for the sellers
to sell their tickets, and the game starts after the period T . The sellers might
come into the market at diﬀerent time, but in each period the number of sellers is
large enough, which the market power for each seller is relative small in the market.
However, because of the heterogeneous tickets, each seller can still decide the price
in every period which maximizes the expected proﬁts. In the model, each seller is
assumed to have only one ticket when coming into the market, and we assume there
is no switching cost to adjust the price everyday until the game. The model is very
similar to section 2.4.3, but the diﬀerence is that tickets are heterogeneous within
the same area according to the distance from seat to home plate and diﬀerent row
numbers. In addition, sellers are assumed not homogeneous in the market, so we
solve each seller’s optimal problem to decide the optimal price for each listing on
each day.
For a seller k coming into the market at period t, the proﬁts maximization problem
can be written as
max
pkt
pktΦkt(pkt) + (1− Φkt(pkt))EVkt+1, t = 1, 2, ..., T (3.1)
where Φkt(pkt) is the probability of sale when seller k decides the price pkt at period
t, and EVkt+1 is the value of the ticket after period t. Because the quantity provided
by each seller is relative small in the market, we can assume that the probability of
sale Φkt(pkt) is exogenous for each seller, which we can estimate that from all the
listings in the market.
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In the last period T , the value EVkT+1 can be explained as the remaining value
of the ticket after the game starts. Some people might be able to attend the game
even if they can not resell their tickets in the secondary market, so the remaining
value should be positive for them. However, some people, such as brokers, have too
many tickets in one game, so they might have zero remaining values for most of the
tickets. As there is no good proxy for the remaining value for those people who can
still attend the game, I calculate the optimal price for each ticket by assuming that
the remaining values are zeros.
The ﬁrst order condition for proﬁts maximization problem is
Φkt(pkt) +
∂Φkt(pkt)
∂pkt
(pkt −EVkt+1) = 0, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (3.2)
By assuming the remaining value of the ticket EVkT+1 = 0, we can solve backwards
and ﬁnd the optimal prices p∗kt from period T to period 1, and the optimal value for
each period is
EV ∗kt = p
∗
ktΦkt(p
∗
kt) + (1− Φkt(p∗kt))EV ∗kt+1, t = 1, 2, ..., T. (3.3)
3.4.2 Probability of Sale
In order to obtain the probability of sale for each ticket in each period, I specify
a probit model as the following:
s∗kt = β0 − αpkt + xktβ + ukt, (3.4)
pkt = xktΠ1 + zktΠ2 + vkt, (3.5)
52
where skt = 1{s∗kt ≥ 0} represents the sale of listings, and xkt includes the distance
from seat to home plate, row number, front row of section dummy, area dummies,
and game dummies to characterize the quality of seats.
In the secondary market, the prices set by the sellers might be correlated with
some unobserved demand shock ukt, so equation (3.5) speciﬁes a cost-based shock
to solve the endogeneity problem. The instrument variable zkt includes the original
price in the primary market, the distance of the seller’s zip code from the stadium,
and the ticket types that the seller buys in the primary market. All of the variables
represent the seller’s cost of buying tickets and the opportunity costs of sale. Those
variables should not be correlated with the unobserved demand shock because the
seller purchases the ticket earlier.
In addition, ukt and vkt are jointly distributed according to a joint normal distri-
bution:
⎛
⎜⎝ ukt
vkt
⎞
⎟⎠ ∼ N
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎜⎝ 0
0
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
⎛
⎜⎝ 1 ρσv
ρσv σ
2
v
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠ , (3.6)
where ρ = 0 if there is no endogeneity problem. If considering the endogeneity
problem, I use the control function approach to estimate the model. 2 If there is
no endogeneity problem, the model can be estimated by equation (3.4) using probit
model. In order to estimate the probability of sales on diﬀerent days more ﬂexibly,
I separately estimate the IV probit model day by day until the game day.
2In order to confirm the validity of the model, I also compare this with the two stage least square
linear probability model, and the results are similar.
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3.5 Estimation and Results
3.5.1 Estimation Results
The estimates are shown in Table 3.4. Diﬀerent columns represent diﬀerent days
before the game. For the coeﬃcients on price, we ﬁnd that price is most sensitive
on the last day and least sensitive 5 days before the game, showing that the demand
becomes more elastic as the game day approaches. In addition, all the characteristics
contribute more to the probability of sale on the last day. Conditional on the same
area and the same game, seats with longer distance from home plate and larger row
number have less probability of sale, and the front row seats have higher probability
of sale.
3.5.2 Comparison of Actual Listing Prices to Optimal Prices
Based on the estimates from Table 3.4, we can calculate the optimal price for
each ticket on each day by equations (3.2) and (3.3). Figure 3.4 shows the optimal
and listing prices for brokers in the last ﬁve days before the game. Because the listing
data contain some extremely high prices, I present the 25 percent quantile, median,
and 75 percent quantile in the following analysis. From 5 days before the game to the
game day, the optimal prices for the brokers decrease over time. The listing prices
set by the brokers are signiﬁcantly higher than optimal though the price pattern over
time is closer to the optimal one.
In Figure 3.5, the listing price pattern is diﬀerent from the optimal price pattern
for the single sellers. Between 1 and 5 days prior to the game, the single sellers tend
to follow the optimal pricing pattern. However, on the last day, the single sellers
tend to price signiﬁcantly higher than optimal. Single sellers, unlike brokers, are
more likely to attend the game if they do not sell the tickets, so they may have a
positive ”residual value”. If we rationalize the behavior of the single sellers on the
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Figure 3.4: Listing and Optimal Prices for Brokers
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last day by assuming the positive remaining values after the game day, the optimal
prices during the 1-5 days prior to the game should also be shifted upward by the
positive remaining values. Then, single sellers would also deviate from the optimal
prices during 1-5 days prior to the game. As a result, the single sellers either price
higher than the optimal price on the last day or deviate from the optimal pattern
during the earlier days.
If we focus on the last day and calculate the diﬀerence between the actual listing
prices and the optimal prices generated by the model, Figure 3.6 shows the Kernel
Density function of the diﬀerence between single sellers and brokers. For most of
the listings set by the brokers, the prices are close to the optimal level, making the
diﬀerences close to zero. However, the single sellers tend to price higher than the
optimal level on the last day, so the Kernel Density function of the diﬀerence shifts
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Figure 3.5: Listing and Optimal Prices for Single Sellers
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from zero to positive.
Another way to compare the actual listing prices with the optimal prices is to
calculate the expected proﬁt loss for each listing. As the seller decides the price in
the secondary market, the diﬀerence between the optimal expected proﬁts (π∗) and
the actual expected proﬁts (πa) could be explained as the ”expected proﬁt loss” for
the seller. So the expected proﬁt losses are calculated by:
π∗kt − πakt, (3.7)
where
πakt = p
a
ktΦkt(p
a
kt) + (1− Φkt(pakt))EV ∗kt+1, t = 1, 2, ..., T, (3.8)
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Figure 3.6: Diﬀerence Between Optimal and Listing Prices on Game Day
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and pakt is the actual listing price for seller k at time t.
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show the median expected proﬁt losses for the single
sellers and brokers. In Figure 3.8, we can ﬁnd that single sellers have the expected
proﬁt losses over 10% of face value on the last day. Figure 3.7 also shows that listings
for the single sellers have the higher expected proﬁt losses than those for the brokers
on the last day, and the diﬀerence between two types of sellers in the expected proﬁt
loss is around $1.31. On other days before the game, the expected proﬁt losses are
close to zero for two reasons. The ﬁrst reason is that the probability of sale within
1 to 5 days prior to the game is not high enough. This means deviating pricing
strategies might not have a signiﬁcant losses on that day. The second reason is
that the sellers are still assumed to price optimally in the next few periods, so the
expected proﬁts on that day could be close to optimal because the optimal pricing
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Figure 3.7: Expected Proﬁt Losses (Dollars)
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Figure 3.8: Expected Proﬁt Losses (Relative to Facevalue)
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Figure 3.9: Cumulative Distribution Function for Expected Proﬁt Losses on Game
Day
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strategy in the next few periods would not have any loss.
Figure 3.9 presents the cumulative distribution function of expected proﬁt losses
for the single sellers and brokers on the last day. Compared with the single sellers, the
brokers have more listings with an expected proﬁt loss of less than 5 dollars. However,
the index of expected proﬁt losses still has some disadvantages. For instance, for
those listings with a higher face value, the larger optimal expected proﬁts can cause
higher expected proﬁt losses. Therefore, I have created another index which is called
the ”expected proﬁt loss rate” to measure how many percentage of expected proﬁts
the seller expects to lose. The expected proﬁt loss rate is deﬁned as
π∗kt − πakt
π∗kt
. (3.9)
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Figure 3.10: Expected Proﬁt Loss Rate
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Figure 3.10 shows the expected proﬁt loss rate for the diﬀerent types of sellers 5
days leading up to the game. The biggest diﬀerence between two types of sellers is
the loss rate on the last day. The single sellers tend to have a higher loss rate than
the brokers. The cumulative distribution function in Figure 3.11 clearly indicates
that the brokers can always price more optimally and have less expected proﬁt loss
rate for their listings.
3.5.3 Discussion
Three possible reasons can explain the diﬀerence between the actual listing prices
and the optimal prices. The ﬁrst is the positive remaining values of the tickets. The
optimal prices increase if the seller has the positive remaining values after the game
day. In Figure 3.5, the diﬀerence on the last day can be rationalized by the positive
remaining values for the single sellers. If we focus on those single sellers who live far
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Figure 3.11: Cumulative Distribution Function for Expected Proﬁt Loss Rate on
Game Day
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from the stadium, then the diﬀerence becomes smaller on the ﬁnal day.
The second one is the cost of changing list price – or a ”menu cost”. Actually,
the switching cost includes the menu cost and the management cost where we had
before assumed zero. For instance, sellers need the time to observe other information
and to decide the price. Switching cost would cause the actual listing prices up and
down the optimal prices; however, the data show that only some sellers do that on
days leading up to the game.
The third possible reason is a bounded rationality explanation. For example,
considering the reference price could cause the optimal price shift to the reference
price, whereas the reference prices would be the price in the primary market or the
transaction price on the previous day. In Figure 3.5, we can ﬁnd that the single
sellers tend to price above the face value even on the ﬁnal day.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I use both listing and transaction data on StubHub to study
diﬀerent pricing strategies for diﬀerent types of sellers. The data show that the
sellers on StubHub can be separated into two types: single sellers and brokers. The
single sellers sell tickets in one or two games during a season, and the brokers sell
many tickets in one given game and also sell tickets in most of the games during the
season. I use the data to estimate the probability of sale by the probit model and
calculate the optimal prices for each listing on each day. The brokers do price more
optimally with the less expected proﬁt losses and even less expected proﬁt loss rate
on the last day than do the single sellers. In addition, during other days before the
game, two types of sellers have the similar expected proﬁt losses, which are close
to zero. Three possible reasons to explain the diﬀerence between the actual listing
prices and the optimal prices can be tested in the future study.
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4. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I discuss dynamic pricing issues not only in the primary
market for the franchise but also in the secondary market for the diﬀerent types of
resellers. In the ﬁrst essay, I use Major League Baseball ticket data from one anony-
mous franchise in the 2011 season to study how the franchise can price dynamically
to increase its revenue. I ﬁnd that the revenue for the franchise can be increased
if the franchise uses the descending price instead of uniform price over time. Even
though the number of tickets sold decreases, the revenue can still be increased by
higher prices in the early days before the event. Compared using a uniform price
schedule over time, the revenue for the franchise can be increased by around 6.93%
if consumers are assumed not strategic in both markets. However, if consumers are
strategic in purchasing tickets, the revenue for the franchise can only be increased
by around 3.67%.
In the second essay, I use both listing and transaction data on StubHub to study
diﬀerent pricing strategies for the diﬀerent types of sellers. The data show that the
sellers on StubHub can be separated into two types: single sellers and brokers. The
single sellers sell tickets in just one or two games during the whole season. The
brokers sell many tickets in a given game and also sell tickets in most of the games
during the season. In addition, I use the data to estimate the probability of sale by
the probit model and calculate the optimal prices for each listing on each day. The
benchmark model shows that brokers do price more optimally with the less expected
proﬁt losses and even less expected proﬁt loss rate on the last day than do the single
sellers. In addition, during other days before the game, two types of sellers have the
similar expected proﬁt losses, which are close to zero.
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